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Abstract 
In recent years there has been a proliferation of Community Based Health 
Insurance (CBHI) schemes designed to enhance access to modern health care 
services and provide financial protection to workers in the informal and rural 
sectors. In June 2011, the Government of Ethiopia introduced a pilot CBHI 
scheme in rural parts of the country. This paper assesses the impact of the 
scheme on utilization of modern health care and the cost of accessing health 
care. It adds to the relatively small body of work that provides a rigorous 
evaluation of CBHI schemes. We∗ find that enrolment leads to a 30 to 41 
percent increase in utilization of outpatient care at public facilities, a 45 to 64 
percent increase in the frequency of visits to public facilities and at least a 56 
percent decline in the cost per visit to public facilities. The effects of the 
scheme on out-of-pocket spending are not as clear. The impact on utilization 
and costs combined with a high uptake rate of almost 50 percent within two 
years of scheme establishment, suggests that this scheme has the potential to 
meet the goal of universal access to health care.  
Keywords 
Community based health insurance, outpatient healthcare utilization, out-of-
pocket expenditure, Ethiopia. 
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1. Introduction 
Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) schemes, which typically cater to 
workers in the informal and rural sectors, have been established in a number of 
developing countries. These schemes, which involve the target population in scheme 
design and management, aim to expand access to modern health care services and 
provide financial protection. 1  As a prelude to potential national level coverage, the 
Government of Ethiopia introduced a pilot Community Based Health Insurance scheme 
in June 2011.  This voluntary CBHI scheme has been established in three districts 
(woredas) located in each of the four main regional states (Amhara, Tigray, Oromiya and 
SNNPR) and offers health insurance to about 300,000 households (about 1.8 million 
individuals).  The aim of this paper is to examine the effect of the scheme on access to 
health care, the cost of accessing care, and household out-of-pocket (OOP) health 
expenditures.  
While there is no dearth of CBHI schemes and indeed evaluations which examine 
the impact of such schemes on utilization of healthcare, financial protection, resource 
mobilization and social exclusion, the quality of the existing evidence has been 
questioned. Existing reviews of this body of work have been conducted by Jakab and 
Krishnan (2001), Preker et al. (2002), Ekman (2004) and Mebratie et al. (2013).  Based on 
45 published and unpublished works, Jakab and Krishnan (2001) conclude that there is 
convincing evidence that community health financing schemes are able to mobilize 
resources to finance healthcare needs, albeit with substantial variation across schemes. 
They also argue that the schemes are effective in terms of reaching low-income groups 
although the ultra-poor are often excluded. Preker et al. (2002), reach a similar 
                                                 
1 Typically, such CBHI schemes are non-profit initiatives built upon the principles of social solidarity and 
designed to provide financial protection against the impoverishing effects of health expenditure for low-
income households in the informal urban sector and in rural areas (Ahuja and Jütting, 2004; Carrin et al. 
2005; Tabor, 2005; Jacobs et al., 2008). Community based implies that the target population which a 
particular scheme is trying to reach is involved in designing and/or managing some or all aspects of such 
schemes. 
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conclusion and point out that there is strong evidence that CBHIs are successful at 
enabling access to health care for the poor and providing financial protection. As 
opposed to these two narrative reviews, based on a systematic review of 36 studies 
conducted between 1980 and 2002, Ekman (2004) finds that while CBHI schemes do 
provide financial protection for low income groups, the magnitude of the effect is small. 
In addition, Ekman (2004) concludes that the evidence base to develop stylized facts is 
questionable and only five studies included in his review may be considered of high-
quality.2 These studies are labeled high-quality studies primarily as they attempt to use 
econometric methods, albeit on cross-section data, to identify the effect of CBHI on 
various outcomes.  
Mebratie et al. (2013) provide an updated systematic review which shows that 
74% of the studies carried out in low and middle-income countries report a positive and 
statistically significant impact of CBHI on healthcare utilization. The schemes are found 
to be more effective in extending access to relatively cheaper outpatient care as 
compared to expensive inpatient care.  Turning to financial protection, 16 studies 
examined the impact of the schemes on out-of-pocket (OOP) payments, of which 44% 
conclude that the schemes are not associated with a reduction in out-of-pocket (OOP) 
healthcare expenditure. Methodologically, a critical comparison of the sets of studies 
reviewed by Ekman (2004) and Mebratie et al. (2013) shows that while there is a clear 
increase in the quality of the empirical data base, some concerns remain, especially if the 
aim is to identify the causal impacts of CBHI schemes.  The key concern is that since 
CBHI enrolment is often a voluntary choice, and may be more likely to attract 
individuals with existing medical conditions and/or relatively wealthy households. 
                                                 
2 Of the 36 papers reviewed by Ekman (2004), five studies (Carrin et al., 1999; Criel and Kegels, 1997; 
Jowett et al., 2003; Jütting, 2001; Ranson, 2001) are considered high-quality. The first two are based on 
descriptive statistics and the remainder use econometric methods. However, all three studies that use 
regression analysis are based on cross sectional data and only one study (Carrin et al., 1999) uses 
longitudinal data. 
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However, except for a handful of papers, the bulk of the CBHI evaluation literature is 
based on cross-section data does not account for such selection effects.3 Working with 
cross-section data and ignoring self-selection is likely to lead to unreliable estimates of 
the effect of such schemes.   
This paper evaluates the impact of Ethiopia’s pilot community based health 
insurance scheme on utilization of modern healthcare, financial protection and the cost 
of care by giving due emphasis to the methodological issue raised above. The analysis 
relies on a three-period panel data, which is augmented by a health facility survey and 
qualitative data obtained from key informants and focus group discussions. The 
longitudinal household data were canvassed before (one wave) and after the intervention 
(two waves) from both pilot and non-pilot districts. The available data base allows us to 
construct different treatment and control groups (within and across the pilot and non-
pilot districts), control for self-selection driven by observable and unobservable time-
invariant factors and to deploy a range of impact evaluation methods to identify causal 
effects.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the key 
features of the CBHI scheme. Section 3 discusses data and the research methods. Section 
4 contains estimates, while the final section provides a discussion and brings the paper to 
a close.  
                                                 
3 According to Mebratie et al., (2013) only 5 of the 35 studies on utilization that apply regression analysis 
using panel data (baseline and follow up). Three of these studies are on China (Yip et al., 2008; Wagstaff et 
al., 2009; Xuemei and Xiao, 2011). Lu et al. (2012) examine the effect of Rwanda’s CBHI scheme while 
Levine et al. (2012) provide an assessment of a scheme in Cambodia.  With regard to OOP health 
spending, only two studies (Wagstaff et al., 2009; Levine et al., 2012) use longitudinal data. 
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2. Key features of the Ethiopian CBHI scheme  
In June 2011 the Ethiopian CBHI scheme was rolled out in 13 pilot districts in four main 
regions (Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, and SNNPR) of the country.4 The pilot districts were 
selected by regional administrative bodies based on directives provided by the Federal 
Ministry of Health (FMoH).  While the chosen districts were expected to fulfill five 
selection criteria, in practice, selection was based on two conditions. Namely, the district 
should have undertaken health care financing reforms designed to increase cost recovery 
and retention of locally raised revenues and that health centres in these districts should 
be geographically accessible (located close to a main road).5  
The scheme was introduced by Ethiopia’s Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH) in 
collaboration with USAID, Abt Associates Inc. (an international consultancy company) 
and CARE Ethiopia (an international non-governmental organization). The scheme is 
part of the government’s broader health care financing reform strategy which aims to 
improve quality and coverage of health services by identifying alternative healthcare 
resources (USAID, 2011). Feasibility studies, scheme design and scheme promotion were 
outsourced to Abt Associates and CARE Ethiopia. The basic design of the scheme - 
benefit packages, registration fees, premium payments – was determined on the basis of 
feasibility studies and in collaboration with regional governments, and is the same within 
each of the pilot regions but differs slightly across regions. Scheme implementation and 
monitoring is conducted by Abt Associates in collaboration with relevant government 
authorities at the central, regional, district, and village levels.  
                                                 
4 The initial plan was to roll out the pilot scheme in 3 districts in each of the four regions. However, an 
additional district in Oromiya region volunteered to join the pilot scheme and was included. Together, 
these four main regions account for about 86 % of the country’s population (Population Census 
Commission, 2008). 
5 The complete set of selection criteria included (1) Willingness of district authorities to implement the 
schemes (2) Commitment of districts to support schemes, (3) Geographical accessibility of health centers 
(4) Quality of health centers, (5) The implementation of cost recovery, local revenue retention, and public 
pharmacy policies in health centers. 
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While the scheme has been introduced by the government, it is ‘community 
based’ in the sense that the community at the village (kebele) level determines whether or 
not to join the scheme and is subsequently involved in scheme management and 
supervision. After being exposed to a range of awareness creation activities a general 
assembly at the village level decided whether or not to join the scheme (a simple majority 
had to support the decision) and then households decide whether to enroll in the 
scheme.6  In order to reduce the possibility of adverse selection the unit of membership 
is the household rather than the individual (FMoH, 2008).  
Household level monthly premiums for core household members range between 
ETB 10.50 in SNNPR to ETB 15 in Oromiya (see Table 1). 7   For each non-core 
household member the monthly premium lies between ETB 2.10 and ETB 3.00.  
Premiums in Amhara region are set at ETB 3.00 per individual per month. The 
premiums amount to about 3% of household monthly income.8 To enhance affordability 
the central government subsidizes a quarter of the premium and district and regional 
governments are expected to cover the costs of providing a fee waiver to the poorest 
10% of the population or so called “indigent groups”.9  
Premium collection intervals differ across pilot districts and are sensitive to local 
conditions. While local level officials and community representatives are able to adjust 
the interval of premium collection they cannot change the premium. In order to enable 
community engagement every village is expected to select 3 delegates/CBHI members 
who will be part of the village CBHI administrative bodies and participate in the general 
                                                 
6 All kebeles in the pilot districts voted in favour of the scheme. 
7 Core household members include a mother, father, and their children below age 18.  
8 This figure is based on an annual per capita income of USD 370 in 2011, an exchange rate of ETB 18 to 
USD 1 and a household of 6 core members.  
9 Indigent groups are defined as those households who do not have land, a house, or any valuable assets. 
According to information obtained from Abt Associates, the coverage of the indigent groups depends on 
the budget allocated by district and regional governments. In December 2013, the share of indigent groups 
as a proportion of the total eligible households (300,605 households) ranged from a low of 0.9 % in Deder 
district in Oromiya to 21.1 % in Tehulederie district in Amhara region. Nation-wide, by December 2013, 
7.4 % of total eligible households had received a fee-waiver. 
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assembly organized at district level. 10  According to information obtained from key 
informant interviews and focus group discussions, village level government officials and 
the community at large are involved in identifying the poorest households and 
implementing the fee waiver arrangement. 
The scheme covers both outpatient and inpatient health care services in public 
facilities. Utilization of care from private providers is usually not permitted unless a 
particular service or drug is unavailable at a public facility. Treatment outside the country 
is not covered.  Medical treatments which have largely cosmetic value (for example, 
artificial teeth and plastic surgery) are excluded.  There are no co-payments as long as 
members follow the scheme’s referral procedure. When they seek care, scheme members 
are first expected to visit a health center and can subsequently access higher level care at 
district or regional hospitals as long as they have referral letters from the health center. 
Members who visit hospitals without referral letters need to cover 50% of their costs.11  
According to our survey data, scheme uptake was 41% in April 2012 and reached 
48% in April 2013 (see Table 2). 12  82% of insured households renewed their 
subscriptions, and 25% of those who had not enrolled in the first year, did eventually 
join the scheme a year later. Enrolment rates vary across regions, ranging from 35% in 
SNNPR in 2013 to 63% in the Amhara region. Compared to the experience of several 
other African countries the speed of uptake is relatively high. For instance, uptake in 
Mali was 11.4% after six years (Diop et al., 2006), 4.8% after two years in Senegal (Smith 
and Sulzbach, 2008), 2.8% in Tanzania after six years (Chee et al., 2002), 35% in Rwanda 
after seven years and 85% after nine years (Shimeles, 2010).  
                                                 
10 However, the qualitative survey has shown that the participation of the community in the decision 
making process of the scheme is limited. Only two CBHI members were actually selected as part of the 
village management and there was no regular meeting with the community to update members about the 
activities of the scheme and collect feedback. 
11 Access to tertiary level care differs across regions. In Amhara and Tigray, CBHI enrollees may visit any 
public hospital within the region but not outside the region. In SNNPR, care is covered only in the nearest 
public hospital while in Oromiya coverage includes hospitals located outside the region. 
12 This figure is very similar to official reports from Abt Associates which indicate an enrollment rate of 
45.5% in December 2012 and 49% in December 2013. 
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3. Data and methods 
3.1 Data  
The paper is based primarily on three-rounds of a household level panel data set from 
rural Ethiopia. The first round of the survey was collected between March and April 
2011, a few months before the roll out of the CBHI scheme, while the second round 
took place a year later during March and April 2012 and the third round in March and 
April 2013.  
The surveys cover 16 districts located in four main regions of the country. 
Twelve of these districts are implementing the CBHI scheme while one district from 
each region is a non-pilot district.13 As mentioned in section 2, districts were selected for 
piloting the scheme if they had implemented a cost recovery and local revenue retention 
programme and if they have health centers that are readily accessible. In each region, the 
non-pilot districts were also selected on the basis of complying with these two 
conditions. Within each district, 6 villages (kebele) were randomly selected and from each 
village 17 households were randomly selected from lists maintained by village 
administrative offices yielding a total of 1,632 households comprising 9,455 individuals. 
The second round of the survey covered 1,599 households and the third round of data 
resurveyed 1,583 (3% attrition) of the households that had been canvassed in the first 
round. 
In addition to an extensive module on household and individual health 
conditions, the surveys contain information on a variety of individual and household 
socio-economic attributes (consumption expenditure, assets, household demographics, 
employment) and village characteristics. The health module includes questions regarding 
health status and outpatient and inpatient health care utilization for each household 
member. The recall period for outpatient health care is two months preceding the survey 
                                                 
13 We do not include the district in Oromiya region that volunteered for the CBHI scheme. 
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while it is 12 months in the case of inpatient health care. Health expenditure including 
transport costs, consultation and diagnosis costs and drug costs for each episode of 
health care consumption are recorded. The second and third rounds of the survey 
enquired whether households had enrolled in the CBHI and they also contain extensive 
modules on understanding of insurance and knowledge of experience with the CBHI 
scheme.  
In order to assess and potentially control for the quality of health care services in 
determining enrollment and outcomes, information from the household surveys was 
combined with data gathered from 48 health care centers (3 randomly selected health 
centers from each of the 16 districts). We focused on health centers as these are usually 
the main source of curative health care in rural Ethiopia. The health facility survey was 
canvassed between April and June 2011, before the introduction of the CBHI scheme. 
The health facility survey contains information on the educational qualifications and 
work experience of the head of the facility, availability of medical equipment, and the 
head’s (self-) assessment of the quality of care provided by the facility. In addition, the 
survey obtained information from five randomly chosen patients who were exiting from 
the health center on the time taken to obtain a patient card and time taken between 
obtaining the patient card and consulting with a health care professional. Based on 
information obtained from the district health offices the sampled households living in 96 
villages were matched to the 48 health centers on the basis of geographical proximity. 
To gain a clearer understanding of scheme design, operation and implementation 
issues, 15 key informant interviews were conducted – three at federal, four at regional, 
four at district and four at the village level. Eight focus group discussions, two in each of 
four villages, were conducted with groups of 7 to 12 individuals. Per village, one of the 
FGDs was conducted with scheme members and focused on their motivation for joining 
the scheme and their views on scheme operation while the other was conducted with 
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non-members and focused on why they had chosen not to join the scheme. In addition, 
both insured and non-insured households also discussed about the benefit of the scheme 
to their communities.   
3.2 Empirical framework  
Our aim is to identify the impact of the CBHI scheme on health care utilization, cost of 
care and out-of-pocket expenditure. There are two channels through which the CBHI 
scheme may promote greater use of health care.  Prior to being offered insurance, 
households in the pilot districts were provided information on the insurance scheme and 
also on the availability of health care services, and the importance of using such services 
when needed. This new information (indirect channel) combined with anticipated 
reductions in the cost of care (direct channel) may be expected to promote greater use of 
modern outpatient and inpatient care.  
With regard to outpatient care, we begin by considering the effect of the scheme 
on the probability of using modern care. This is followed by an examination of the effect 
of the scheme on the use of public and private modern care. It is possible that insurance 
leads to a substitution from private to public care but there may also be an increase in the 
use of private care, since such care is subsidized in case public facilities cannot offer the 
required services. For scheme enrollees, access to tertiary level care, at least if 
reimbursement is desired, is contingent on being referred by health centers. Through this 
requirement the scheme may also have a bearing on the source of care and enrolled 
households may be more likely to visit health centers as opposed to hospitals. To 
examine this possibility we consider the impact of the scheme on the probability of using 
different sources of care (health post, health centers, hospitals). In addition, we also 
examine scheme effect on the intensity of health care usage (number of visits to a health 
facility per household member). While we do consider the effect of the scheme on 
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inpatient care, our efforts are impeded by the limited use of such care during the time 
period under scrutiny.  
With regard to financial protection, we examine the effect of the scheme on out-
of-pocket health-related expenditure and the probability that households experience 
catastrophic health expenditures, which we define as amounting to at least 5 or 10% of 
their total household expenditure.  Since the scheme covers only spending on healthcare, 
we examine its effect on medical costs (consultation and medicine) and ancillary costs 
(transport and others) separately. 
The voluntary nature of CBHI enrolment is the key concern for identifying the 
effect of the scheme. Enrollment may be driven by unobserved household characteristics 
that are systematically associated with the outcomes, and thereby confound the estimates 
of the effect of the scheme. For example, latent health conditions or income can 
influence the demand for health care as well as the demand for health insurance. 
Ignoring this would lead to biased estimates, although the direction of the bias is a priori 
unknown and depends on the source.   
To control for observed and unobserved traits that do not change over time but 
which may have a bearing on scheme enrollment, we exploit the longitudinal nature of 
the data at hand and estimate a household fixed-effect model,  
itititit ευφTβCBHIαy ++++= ,      (1) 
where, i ty indicates the outcome of interest for household i at time t. T indicates the time 
period of the observation (2012 or 2013), itCBHI indicates whether household i is 
enrolled in the scheme in year t,  is the treatment effect, ui  is a household fixed effect 
and it is a time-variant error term. To control for time-variant observable factors that 
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may affect the outcomes we also control for a range of time varying household and 
community level covariates ( itX )
14 
ititititit TXCBHIy   .     (2) 
Finally, we also use propensity score matching (nearest neighbor matching) and 
subsequently estimate equation (2) using only treated and controls that are on support. 
Among other variables, the propensity score specification includes baseline values of 
self-assessed health status, illness experience, and the quality of care.15 
We have two potential control groups – uninsured households in the pilot 
districts and uninsured households in the non-pilot districts.  Since enrollment is 
voluntary, there is a risk of selection on unobservables in pilot districts. Furthermore, 
since all households in the pilot districts have been provided information on the scheme 
and the importance of using modern health services it is possible that the scheme 
influences outcomes even for those who do not enroll (spillover effects). To guard 
against this possibility we use an alternative control group – households from non-pilot 
districts. But while estimates based on comparing the treated with control households 
from such districts are unlikely to be contaminated by spillover effects there are other 
concerns. Although, drawn from the same region and based on the same criteria used to 
identify the pilot districts, households residing in pilot versus non-pilot districts may 
differ in terms of their observed and unobserved traits and may also be subject to 
                                                 
14 The vector Xit includes education of household head, demographic composition of the household, time 
taken to reach the nearest health center, time taken to reach the nearest hospital, time taken to reach the 
nearest all weather road, access to water, access to electricity. Since variables such as household 
consumption, self-assessed health status, (chronic) illness history, and trust in modern care may be 
influenced by CBHI uptake these are not included in Xit.. However, estimates with the inclusion of time 
varying consumption and health status variables are similar to those reported in the paper.  
15 The full set of control variables in the propensity score equation include characteristics of the head (sex, 
age, education and religion), characteristics of the household (size, composition, self-assessed health status, 
illness experience in two months recall period, consumption quintiles), public infrastructure (travel time to 
the nearest health facilities, travel time to the nearest asphalt road and all weather road, access to water, 
source of light), trust in modern care, condition of health facility (educational level of the head of the 
facility, provision of on job training for head, availability of medical equipment for blood and urine tests, 
waiting time to get medical card and see medical doctors, perceived quality of health facility) and regional 
dummies. 
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different risks and shocks over time, which should be less of a concern for households 
residing in the same district.  We estimate all three empirical models outlined above for 
both control groups, which serves as a robustness check and also allows us to gauge the 
parallel trends assumption. If the identifying assumption holds then there should be 
similar trends in the outcomes for the two uninsured groups, and we would expect the 
impact estimates to be robust to the choice of control group.  
4. Estimates 
4.1 Who enrolls? 
Given the voluntary nature of the scheme, a key concern is whether scheme participants 
and non-participants are similar with regard to traits that may influence both uptake and 
outcome. Descriptive statistics for insured and uninsured households, both in districts 
where the scheme was offered and not offered display some evidence of greater 
similarity between households located in the same district as compared to those in a 
different district.16 Larger households with more educated household heads, belonging to 
the poorest quintiles and those with a good self-reported heath status are more likely to 
enroll. Quality of care is found to be an important factor in determining enrolment.  
However, when we include all these variables as controls in a logit model of the 
probability that households in the CBHI districts join the scheme, we find that health 
status and household socio-economic status do not have a bearing on enrollment and 
that the key factors determining enrolment are quality of health care services and regional 
fixed-effects.17 The lack of evidence from the enrollment regression that wealthier or less 
healthy households are more likely to join the scheme, allay concerns about household 
selection effects confounding the impact estimates. At the same time, in addition to 
controlling for fixed effects, the estimates highlight the need to control for differences in 
                                                 
16 See Table A1 of the supplemental appendix. 
17 Results reported in Table A2 of the supplemental appendix. 
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access to better quality health care as such access may lead to greater health care usage 
regardless of CBHI enrollment. 
4.2 Health care utilization 
Trends in outpatient health care utilization by CBHI status are provided in Table 3.  In 
2011, the share of insured and non-insured households in pilot districts using outpatient 
care from modern providers is similar (38 percent for insured and 39 percent for 
uninsured).18 Once CBHI was introduced, the utilization of outpatient care shows a slight 
increase for the insured while it declines for non-insured households. In CBHI control 
districts utilization is more stable. The same pattern holds for use of care from public 
providers. The use of private care shows a decrease from 2011 to 2013 for the treatment 
and control groups. In terms of health care by source, the share of households using 
outpatient care from health centers increases by 10 percentage points (from 20% in 2011 
to 30% in 2013) for the insured while there is a slight decline for the two control groups. 
The insured also seem to be using public health facilities more intensively. For instance, 
the number of outpatient visits per insured household member increases from 0.11 visits 
in 2011 to 0.14 visits in 2013 while for uninsured households in the pilot districts the 
corresponding numbers are 0.12 visits in 2011 and 0.07 visits in 2013.      
Estimates of the effect of the CBHI scheme on outpatient care utilization, 
utilization by source and the intensity of use are provided in Tables 4, 5 and 6, 
respectively. Estimates are provided for each of the control groups and using the three 
methods outlined in section 3. Based on the estimates reported in columns 4 to 6 of 
Table 4, access to CBHI is associated with a 6 to 11 percentage point increase in the use 
of modern health care. The point estimate is larger (11 percentage point increase) when 
households within the pilot districts are used as a control group as compared to 
households located in the non-pilot districts (6 percentage point increase).  The effect 
                                                 
18 Modern health care use includes utilization of health care services from health posts, health centers, 
private/NGO clinics, and public/private/NGO hospitals. 
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emanates mainly from an increase in the probability of using public providers. The 8 to 
11 percentage point increase in the use of public providers translates into a 30 to 41% 
increase relative to baseline values. There is no statistically significant increase in the use 
of care from private providers. This is not unexpected, as typically, the scheme does not 
cover care provided by private clinics. Estimates are not sensitive to the estimation 
approach.  
As shown in Table 5, the entire increase in the probability of using publicly 
provided care comes from increased use of health centers. Focusing on estimates in 
columns 4 to 6 we see that the scheme is associated with a 10 to 11 percentage point 
increase in the probability of using health centers and a 1 to 3 percentage point reduction 
in the probability of using public hospitals, although not always statistically significant. 
The pattern of increased use of health centers combined with a decline in the use of 
hospitals is consistent with the scheme design which creates incentives for patients to 
visit health centers before they try to access higher level care.  
Not only does the scheme increase the probability of using care, it also leads to 
an increase in the frequency of visits to health care providers. Table 6, columns 4 to 6, 
shows that in the 2 months preceding the survey, scheme participation leads to an 
increase in the number of outpatient visits per household member to a public facility by 
about 0.05 to 0.07. This is a 45 to 64% increase in the frequency of health care use, 
relative to the baseline (0.11 visits). The results are again robust to the estimation 
approach and choice of control group. To appreciate this effect, consider that on an 
annual basis for a 6 person household these effects translate into an additional 2 
(0.05*6*6) to 3 (0.07*6*6) visits per household per year as compared to households who 
are not enrolled.  
Unfortunately we were not able to assess the effects of CBHI on the utilization 
of inpatient care, due to limited variation in the outcome variables. We did estimate the 
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same models for inpatient care but the coefficients for CBHI participation are essentially 
zero, regardless of method and control group.19 The use of inpatient care in the 12 
months preceding each survey is below 5% and we suspect that there is insufficient 
variation to identify precise treatment effects. 
4.3 Health care spending 
Descriptive statistics for expenditure on health care for each of the three years and 
conditional on insurance status are provided in Table 7, with estimates of the impact of 
the program on outpatient health care spending in Table 8. The estimates in columns 4 
to 6 show that the scheme exerts a negative effect on health care spending which is 
almost entirely due to a reduction in costs of consultation and medicine.  Depending on 
the control group, the magnitude ranges from 11 to 27 Birr or a reduction of between 21 
to almost 50% of baseline expenditure. However, the effects are not always precise, 
depending on the choice of control group.  
 We also estimated the effect of the scheme on health care spending as a share of 
household monthly expenditure. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 9 while 
estimates are in Tables 10. The scheme does seem to work towards reducing the share of 
the household budget spent on health. While across all estimates the coefficients are 
negative they are not always precise. At most the scheme appears to be associated with a 
0.9 percent decline in the share of the household budget spent on health care. As 
compared to the baseline value for currently insured household this represents a 33% 
decline in resources spent on health care.20 
                                                 
19 Trends in utilization of inpatient care and estimates of the impact of CBHI on inpatient care utilization 
are provided in Tables A3 and A4 of the supplemental appendix. 
20 We also find that CBHI coverage is associated with a lower probability of being exposed to incidence of 
potentially impoverishing health expenditure (defined as 5 and 10 percent of total household expenditure).  
However, similar to spending shares, the effects are not precise (not shown here but reported in Tables A6 
and A7 of the supplemental appendix). Estimates based on defining the dependent variable in terms of 
health expenditure as a share of non-food expenditure or health expenditure as a share of non-health 
expenditure were similar (not reported). 
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While the CBHI has a clear effect on increasing the use of health care services, 
the effect on reducing the cost of accessing health care is not overwhelming. The 
increase in the use of health care without a corresponding increase in the amount spent 
on health care indicates that the cost per health care visit should have declined. To 
confirm the magnitude of this effect we estimate the cost of accessing outpatient care per 
visit, conditional on using health care. Trends in the cost of care based on an unbalanced 
panel are provided in Table 11 while estimates (difference-in-differences) of the scheme 
on cost of care per visit are displayed in Table 12.21 As may be expected, the estimates 
reveal a sharp decline in the cost per visit facing insured households. The effect is driven 
mainly by the decline in the cost of accessing care from public facilities. The estimates in 
columns 4 to 6 of Table 12 indicate that the cost of care per visit to a public facility 
declines by about 35 to 54 Birr per visit. Compared to the baseline cost of 62 Birr per 
visit to a public facility these changes represent declines of between 56 to 87%.  
Overall, while households are still incurring costs per visit, and the reasons for 
this requires investigation, there is a clear, statistically significant and substantial decline 
in the costs of accessing outpatient care from public health care facilities while there is 
no effect of the scheme on the cost of care per visit at a private facility. 
4.4 Placebo tests 
While implicit in the preceding discussion, to explicitly examine the identifying 
assumption underlying the empirical strategy used in the paper we compare outcome 
trends for the two control groups between 2011 & 2012 and between 2012 & 2013. Since 
neither of these groups have been exposed to the programme, in principle there should 
                                                 
21 The analysis focuses on outpatient care, as very few individuals make use of inpatient care. The estimates 
are conditional on the use of health care. Imposing such a restriction leads to a sharp decline in the 
number of observations as this variable is not defined for households in all three waves unless they utilize 
outpatient care in all three waves. Hence, we provide diff-in-diff estimates based on an unbalanced panel in 
Table 12. However, results for a balanced panel of households that incurred health care expenditure in all 
three years also suggest a large decline in the cost per visit (reported in Table A8 and A9 of the 
supplemental appendix). 
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be no statistically significant differences in outcomes overtime for households belonging 
to these two control groups. A first indication that the parallel trends assumption holds is 
that we find similar results for the different control groups. In addition to this, we tested 
for differences in annual changes in utilization of various types of outpatient care, the 
absolute amount of money spent on health care and health care spending as a proportion 
of household expenditure, without controlling for covariates. 22  There is very little 
evidence to support the hypothesis that the identifying assumption has been violated. 
Except for six percent of the outcomes (3 out of 48), differences in outcome trends 
between the two groups are not statistically significant. Furthermore, as discussed above, 
the increase in utilization of health care is restricted to public facilities and there is no 
effect on the use of private care. Consistent with this pattern, there is a sharp decline in 
the cost per visit of using public care while there is no decline in the case of cost per 
visits at private care facilities. The clear effect on outcomes that should be influenced by 
the scheme and the lack of an effect on outcomes that are not expected to be affected 
also supports the claim that we are able to credibly identify causal effects.  
5. Discussion and concluding remarks 
To enhance access to health care services and provide financial protection against health 
care costs, the Government of Ethiopia introduced a pilot Community Based Health 
Insurance scheme in June 2011. This paper used three waves of longitudinal data 
canvassed before and after the introduction of the pilot, and two different control groups 
to identify the scheme’s impact on utilization of health care and the costs of accessing 
care. Depending on the control group in question, our analysis shows that as compared 
to the situation at baseline, the scheme leads to a 30 to 41 percent increase in utilization 
of outpatient care at public facilities, a 45 to 64 percent increase in the frequency of 
outpatient visits to public facilities, and a 56 to 87 percent decline in the cost per 
                                                 
22 The test results are not presented here, but in Tables A10, A11 and A12 of the supplementary appendix. 
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outpatient visit to public facilities. Due to lack of variation in inpatient utilization, we are 
not able to assess the effects on access to inpatient care. The scheme also works towards 
reducing the effect on out-of-pocket spending but the estimates are not precise. Placebo 
tests to examine the veracity of the identifying assumption underlying our analysis and 
the lack of an effect on the use of and cost of accessing private care, which is typically 
not covered by the scheme, supports a causal interpretation of the findings. 
At first glance, the lack of a statistically clear effect on out-of-pocket spending is 
puzzling. Insights gleaned from key informant interviews and focus group discussions 
help shed some light on this issue. A number of scheme enrollees who participated in the 
focus group discussions reported that they paid for consultations and drugs. There were 
several reasons for this, such as forgetting to take their membership card while visiting 
facilities, attempting to access higher levels of care without a referral letter, and late 
renewal of membership. Respondents also expressed concerns about the quality of 
services on offer, in particular, the limited availability of drugs and equipment which then 
forces households to resort to private care. Finally, a number of respondents mentioned 
the discriminatory attitude of health providers and their tendency to favor uninsured fee-
paying patients. 
Notwithstanding these issues, an uptake of almost half the target households 
within two years of scheme establishment and the large effects on utilization are 
impressive. As the government considers a nation-wide scale up of the scheme the 
results reported in this paper suggest that this scheme has the potential to meet some of 
the goals of universal access to health coverage.  
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Table 1 
CBHI in Ethiopia – Premiums, payment intervals and enrollment  
 
Region 
 
Unit of 
contribution 
Premium per month  
Payment interval 
Core 
household 
members* 
Per extended 
family member 
Tigray Household  ETB 11.00  ETB 2.50 Annual  
Amhara Individual ETB   3.00  ETB 3.00 Biannual  
Oromiya Household ETB 15.00 ETB 3.00 Gimbichu district -  annual 
Kuyu, Deder, and L. Kossa districts – 
annual or biannual 
SNNPR Household ETB 10.50  ETB 2.10 Yirgalem and D. Woyde – quarterly 
Damboya  - three times a year 
Notes: In addition to the premiums there is a one-time registration fee of ETB 5.00 per household.   
Source: Abt Associates and key informant interviews at the federal, district and regional levels. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
 CBHI enrollment and drop-out in the pilot regions 
 
Region 
April 2012 April 2013 
Enrolled Enrolled Dropped-out  New members 
 % N % N % N % N 
Tigray 33.9 101 50.2 146 26.5 26 38.3 74 
Amhara 49.5 148 62.7 188 6.9 10 33.8 52 
Oromiya 44.2 133 44.5 133 21.2 28 17.4 29 
SNNPR 35.3 107 35.4 107 21.5 23 11.8 23 
         
Total 40.7 489 48.2 574 18.0 87 25.1 178 
Note: Among insured households in 2012, one household did not report its enrollment status and five households 
were not resurveyed in 2013. 
Source: The 2012 and 2013 poverty dynamics, health shocks and coping strategies in Ethiopia surveys.
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Table 3 
Outpatient care utilization by CBHI membership status (balanced panel) 
Outcome variable 
 
 
 
 
CBHI pilot districts Non-CBHI pilot districts 
 
(N=384) 
Insured households 
(N= 569) 
Uninsured households 
(N= 616) 
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
          
Use of health care          
Share of households using outpatient care 
from modern providers  
0.38 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.31 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.32 
Share of households using outpatient care 
from public providers 
0.27 0.32 0.35 0.29 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.20 
Share of households using outpatient care 
from private providers (clinic) 
0.10 0.12 0.7 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.12 0.14 0.10 
          
Use of health care, by source          
Share of households using outpatient care 
from a health post (public) 
0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Share of households using outpatient care 
from health centers (public) 
0.20 0.26 0.30 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.15 
The share of households used outpatient 
care from public hospital  
0.06 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 
          
Intensity of use          
No. of outpatient visits per hh. member to 
modern facility  
0.15 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.11 
No. of outpatient visits per hh. member to 
public facility  
0.11 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.07 
No. of outpatient visits per hh. member to 
private facility  
0.04 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Notes: In 2011, a household is categorized under insured group if the household was insured in 2012 or in 2013. Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and 
the two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results.  The figures refer to the use of outpatient care in the two months preceding the survey. 
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Table 4 
The impact of CBHI on the probability of outpatient care utilization 
Outcome variable Fixed effects without covariates Fixed effects with time varying 
covariates 
Fixed effects after matching a 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(1) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(2) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(3) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(4) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(5) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-
pilot districts 
(6) 
Control 
hh. from 
pilot 
districts 
(7) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(8) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(9) 
Share of households using outpatient 
care from modern providers  
0.101*** 0.0600** 0.0797*** 0.107*** 0.0580* 0.0787*** 0.104*** 0.0490 0.0752*** 
(0.0302) (0.0295) (0.0280) (0.0305) (0.0310) (0.0284) (0.0303) (0.0373) (0.0281) 
Share of households using outpatient 
care from public providers 
 
0.108*** 0.0856*** 0.0985*** 0.114*** 0.0821*** 0.0983*** 0.110*** 0.0845** 0.0935*** 
(0.0271) 
 
(0.0274) 
 
(0.0256) (0.0275) (0.0284) (0.0259) (0.0274) (0.0338) (0.0255) 
Share of households using outpatient 
care from private providers  
0.0243 0.00999 0.0172 0.0233 0.00839 0.0149 0.0205 0.0251 0.0138 
(0.0208) (0.0233) (0.0198) (0.0225) (0.0256) (0.0217) (0.0224) (0.0329) (0.0220) 
Number of observations 3,555 3,126 4,707 3,369 2,940 4,418 3,265 1,906 4,146 
Notes: Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Outcome variable is equal to one if at least one household member has used outpatient care in the two months preceding the survey; a Nearest neighbor matching was used 
to create a sample of treated and matched controls.  
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Table 5 
The impact of CBHI on the probability of outpatient care utilization by source 
Outcome variable Fixed effects without covariates Fixed effects with time varying 
covariates 
Fixed effects after matching a 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(1) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(2) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(3) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(4) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(5) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(6) 
Control 
hh. from 
pilot 
districts 
(7) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(8) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(9) 
Share of households using outpatient 
care from a health post  
0.0102 0.0102 0.00968 0.00648 0.00909 0.00767 0.00387 0.00880 0.00601 
(0.0104) (0.0115) (0.00975) (0.0110) (0.0123) (0.0102) (0.0117) (0.0118) (0.0106) 
Share of households using outpatient 
care from a health center  
0.109*** 0.105*** 0.108*** 0.110*** 0.0995*** 0.106*** 0.104*** 0.0897*** 0.101*** 
(0.0220) (0.0237) (0.0213) (0.0212) (0.0234) (0.0206) (0.0216) (0.0300) (0.0201) 
Share of households using outpatient 
care from a public hospital  
-0.0178 -0.0324*** -0.0239** -0.0117 -0.0310*** -0.0220* -0.00688 -0.0241* -0.0209* 
(0.0120) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0124) (0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0116) 
Number of observations 3,555 3,126 4,707 3,369 2,940 4,418 3,265 1,906 4,146 
Notes: Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Outcome variable is equal to one if at least one household member has used outpatient care in the two months preceding the survey; a Nearest neighbor matching was used 
to create a sample of treated and matched controls.  
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Table 6 
The impact of CBHI on the intensity of outpatient care utilization 
Outcome variable Fixed effects without covariates Fixed effects with time varying 
covariates 
Fixed effects after matching a 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(1) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(2) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(3) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(4) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(5) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(6) 
Control 
hh. from 
pilot 
districts 
(7) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(8) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(9) 
No. of outpatient visits per hh. 
member to modern facility 
0.0620*** 0.0436** 0.0554*** 0.0624*** 0.0376* 0.0516*** 0.0631*** 0.0585** 0.0525*** 
(0.0217) (0.0194) (0.0181) (0.0231) (0.0209) (0.0191) (0.0237) (0.0260) (0.0197) 
No. of outpatient visits per hh. 
member to public facility 
0.0628*** 0.0542*** 0.0589*** 0.0675*** 0.0535*** 0.0595*** 0.0676*** 0.0594** 0.0594*** 
(0.0165) (0.0160) (0.0149) (0.0170) (0.0157) (0.0150) (0.0177) (0.0251) (0.0156) 
No. of outpatient visits per hh. 
member to private facility 
0.0160 0.00452 0.00938 0.0140 0.000386 0.00639 0.0150 0.00522 0.00801 
(0.0113) (0.0110) (0.0101) (0.0125) (0.0133) (0.0116) (0.0126) (0.0165) (0.0118) 
Number of observations 3,555 3,126 4,707 3,369 2,940 4,418 3,265 1,906 4,146 
Notes: Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Outcome variable is number of outpatient visits per household member in the two months preceding the survey; a Nearest neighbor matching was used to create a sample of treated 
and matched controls.  
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Table 7 
Healthcare expenditure by CBHI membership status (balanced panel), Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Outcome variable 
 
 
 
Outpatient care 
CBHI pilot districts Non-CBHI pilot districts 
 
(N= 384) 
Insured households  
(N= 569) 
Uninsured households 
(N= 616) 
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
Consultation and medicine spending  53.4 49.8 23.0 42.8 40.9 32.0 38.7 48.4 66.7 
 (218.8) (267.1) (97.1) (123.4) (195.9) (100.4) (130.4) (194.0) (321.4) 
Transport and other health care related 
spending  
13.6 15.5 13.5 6.2 7.2 10.9 8.0 12.6 13.0 
 (65.7) (78.2) (90.0) (30.9) (43.8) (47.3) (26.2) (55.6) (55.8) 
Total health spending  66.9 65.2 36.5 48.9 48.0 42.9 46.7 61.0 79.7 
 (268.6) (303.0) (167.0) (146.8) (219.4) (128.5) (145.3) (233.5) (357.2) 
          
Inpatient care          
Consultation and medicine spending  41.6 26.4 43.2 29.1 37.4 21.3 7.5 19.1 38.4 
 (352.2) (249.3) (352.4) (399.0) (284.6) (331.4) (138.1) (162.4) (329.3) 
Transport and other health care related 
spending  
6.3 7.7 21.1 9.2 12.9 15.5 0.6 10.5 23.5 
 (69.2) (79.4) (140.2) (98.4) (103.6) (205.2) (9.4) (86.7) (270.2) 
Total health spending  47.9 34.2 64.3 38.2 50.3 36.8 8.1 29.5 61.8 
 (410.2) (310.9) (456.9) (483.0) (363.9) (511.0) (147.4) (241.4) (443.7) 
Note: In 2011, a household is categorized under insured group if the household was insured in 2012 or in 2013. Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two 
follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Outpatient health care spending is household’s health care payment (in Birr) in the two months preceding the survey; Inpatient 
health care spending is household’s health care payment (in Birr) in the twelve months preceding the survey; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level.  
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Table 8 
The impact of CBHI on out-of-pocket spending for outpatient care 
Outcome variable Fixed effects without covariates Fixed effects with time varying 
covariates 
Fixed effects after matching a 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(1) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(2) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(3) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(4) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(5) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(6) 
Control 
hh. from 
pilot 
districts 
(7) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(8) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(9) 
Consultation and medicine spending 
 
-14.51 -30.05** -22.39* -11.04 -27.56* -20.07 -5.355 -17.59 -15.36 
(13.35) (13.73) (12.72) (13.87) (15.23) (13.53) (12.13) (19.64) (12.02) 
Transport and other health care  
 
-2.619 -3.487 -3.277 -2.230 -3.207 -3.231 -0.868 1.577 -2.416 
(4.292) (3.858) (3.966) (4.566) (4.150) (4.213) (4.542) (4.568) (4.222) 
Total health spending  
 
-17.13 -33.53** -25.67 -13.27 -30.77* -23.30 -6.223 -16.01 -17.78 
(16.32) (16.37) (15.49) (17.02) (17.99) (16.42) (15.18) (22.46) (14.87) 
Number of observations 3,555 3,126 4,707 3,369 2,940 4,418 3,265 1,906 4,146 
Notes: Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Outcome variable is household’s health care payment (in Birr) for outpatient care in the two months preceding the survey; a Nearest neighbor matching was used to create a sample of treated and 
matched controls.  
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Table 9 
Healthcare spending as a share of expenditure by CBHI membership status (balanced panel) 
Outcome variable 
 
 
 
CBHI pilot districts Non-CBHI pilot districts  
 
(N=383) 
Insured households (N= 562) Uninsured households 
(N= 605) 
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
Consultation/medicine spending as share of household 
monthly expenditure  
0.023 0.015 0.007 0.022 0.014 0.011 0.016 0.015 0.018 
Transport/other health care related spending as share of 
household monthly expenditure  
0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 
Total health care spending as share of household monthly 
expenditure 
0.027 0.020 0.011 0.026 0.017 0.015 0.019 0.020 0.022 
          
Incidence of households where consultation/medicine 
spending is at least 5% of household monthly expenditure 
0.132 0.089 0.042 0.131 0.083 0.073 0.081 0.096 0.099 
Incidence of households where transport/other health care 
related spending is at least 5% of household monthly 
expenditure 
0.030 0.035 0.009 0.023 0.023 0.028 0.013 0.029 0.016 
Incidence of total health care spending is at least 5% of  
household monthly expenditure 
0.150 0.103 0.056 0.152 0.094 0.102 0.099 0.112 0.115 
          
Incidence of households where consultation/medicine 
spending is at least 10% of household monthly expenditure 
0.073 0.058 0.016 0.074 0.046 0.023 0.052 0.047 0.036 
Incidence of households where transport/other health care 
related spending is at least 10% of household monthly 
expenditure 
0.018 0.017 0.004 0.006 0.014 0.005 0.005 0.010 0.010 
Incidence of total health care spending is at least 10% of  
household monthly expenditure 
0.085 0.066 0.032 0.078 0.051 0.039 0.060 0.057 0.063 
Notes: In 2011, a household is categorized under insured group if the household was insured in 2012 or in 2013. Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up 
surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Healthcare spending is for both inpatient and outpatient 
care services. 
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Table 10 
The impact of CBHI on healthcare spending as a share of expenditure 
Outcome variable Fixed effects without covariates Fixed effects with time varying 
covariates 
Fixed effects after matching a 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(1) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(2) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(3) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(4) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(5) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(6) 
Control 
hh. from 
pilot 
districts 
(7) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(8) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(9) 
Consultation/medicine spending as 
share of household monthly 
expenditure  
-0.00299 -0.00861** -0.00586* -0.00134 -0.00803** -0.00490 -0.000220 -0.00662 -0.00404 
(0.00343) (0.00336) (0.00320) (0.00372) (0.00361) (0.00347) (0.00350) (0.00463) (0.00334) 
Transport/other health care related 
spending as share of household 
monthly expenditure 
-0.00104 -0.00131 -0.00140 -0.00101 -0.00120 -0.00143 -0.000657 0.000397 -0.00125 
(0.00118) (0.00109) (0.00109) (0.00127) (0.00117) (0.00116) (0.00127) (0.00156) (0.00118) 
Total health care spending as share of 
household monthly expenditure 
-0.00403 -0.00992** -0.00726* -0.00235 -0.00923** -0.00633 -0.000877 -0.00622 -0.00529 
(0.00414) (0.00404) (0.00386) (0.00449) (0.00437) (0.00418) (0.00424) (0.00559) (0.00403) 
Number of observations 3,501 3,090 4,650 3,316 2,906 4,363 3,230 1,892 4,111 
Notes: Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; * p<0.1; 
Healthcare spending is for both inpatient and outpatient care services; ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 a Nearest neighbor matching was used to create a sample of treated and matched controls.  
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Table 11 
Cost of health care use, unbalanced panel, conditional on health care use, Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Outcome variable 
 
Outpatient care 
CBHI pilot districts Non-CBHI pilot districts 
Insured households  Uninsured households 
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
Modern care price 56.2 56.0 34.4 47.4 63.1 70.9 58.1 101.8 159.7 
 (92.5) (129.6) (100.8) (63.0) (104.3) (113.5) (91.9) (205.5) (524.0) 
Number of observations 269 200 225 205 216 181 127 118 125 
Public care price 61.9 32.9 22.7 55.3 65.5 65.3 52.2 64.6 91.4 
 (101.9) (71.3) (64.3) (92.8) (117.7) (104.8) (88.9) (177.7) (111.6) 
Number of observations 194 159 197 154 165 135 88 86 80 
Private care price 118.8 131.8 119.0 76.5 79.7 129.5 116.3 138.1 279.0 
 (185.4) (207.0) (210.3) (126.5) (122.5) (175.6) (207.7) (254.2) (891.8) 
Number of observations 71 60 37 60 60 51 48 55 37 
Note: In 2011, a household is categorized under insured group if the household was insured in 2012 or in 2013. Cost of outpatient care use is defined as 
a household’s payment for health care - consultation and medicine, in Birr, per outpatient visit in the two months preceding the survey.  
  
 
31 
 
Table 12 
Cost of healthcare care, unbalanced panel, conditional on health care use  
Outcome variable Diff-in-Diff without covariates Diff-in-Diff with covariates 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(1) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(2) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(3) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(4) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(5) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(6) 
Modern care price  
 
 
Number of observations 
-21.29** -81.79*** -47.55*** -24.95** -98.71*** -55.09*** 
(10.47) (27.29) (14.68) (10.12) (35.74) (18.28) 
      
1,294 1,137 1,664 1,205 1,041 1,527 
Public care price 
 
 
Number of observations 
-31.32** -54.69*** -40.11*** -34.73*** -54.26*** -41.94*** 
(12.06) (16.93) (11.30) (12.89) (17.15) (11.56) 
      
1,002 857 1,256 927 792 1,156 
Private care price  
 
 
Number of observations 
-16.39 -79.40 -49.21 -15.57 -130.4 -62.08 
(35.76) (57.77) (40.60) (34.69) (83.36) (49.12) 
      
337 329 477 326 302 444 
Notes: Cost of outpatient care use is defined as a household’s payment for health care - consultation and medicine, in Birr, per outpatient visit in the  
two months preceding the survey. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05. 
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Table A1 
Descriptive statistics at baseline, 2011, Mean (Std. Dev.) 
VARIABLES Insured hhds 
in CBHI 
districts 
(N=489) 
1 
Non-Insured 
hhds in CBHI 
districts 
(N=714) 
2 
P-value 
H0: (1=2) 
 
3 
Non-Insured 
hhds in non-
CBHI districts 
       (N=429) 
          4 
P-value 
H0: (1=4) 
 
5 
Characteristics of the head      
Male headed hh.  0.90 0.85 0.0108 0.843 0.0190 
 (0.306) (0.362)  (0.364)  
Age of hh. head 46.91 46.79 0.8860 44.40 0.0053 
 (12.68) (14.75)  (14.14)  
No education at all 0.424 0.484 0.0387 0.483  0.0790 
 (0.495) (0.50)  (0.50)  
Informal education 0.16 0.11 0.0214 0.125  0.1394 
 (0.367) (0.318)  (0.331)  
Primary or above primary education 0.42 0.401 0.6313 0.392 0.4856 
 (0.49) (0.491)  (0.489)  
Household size 6.25 5.61 0.0000 5.58 0.0000 
 (2.211) (2.264)  (2.105)  
Household composition  (share)      
Share of children aged under 6 0.13 0.15 0.0669 0.176 0.0000 
 (0.136) (0.160)  (0.171)  
Share of male aged 6 to 15 0.165 0.149 0.0766 0.159 0.5297 
 (0.147) (0.154)  (0.159)  
Share of female aged 6 to 15 0.162 0.141 0.0108 0.145 0.0821 
 (0.144) (0.147)  (0.157)  
Share of male aged 16 to 64 0.255 0.247 0.4008 0.230 0.0126 
 (0.147) (0.167)  (0.159)  
Share of female aged 16 to 64 0.253 0.256 0.7691 0.248 0.5596 
 (0.136) (0.156)  (0.151)  
Share of elderly aged above 64 0.034 0.061 0.0029 0.044 0.2613 
 (0.108) (0.176)  (0.137)  
Self-assessed health status (SAH) – share of household       
Share of household with good SAH 0.81 0.74 0.0015 0.857 0.0126 
 (0.317) (0.376)  (0.288)  
Share of household with fair SAH 0.147 0.207 0.0016 0.117 0.1093 
 (0.286) (0.352)  (0.272)  
Share of household with low SAH 0.046 0.052 0.4860 0.024 0.0082 
 (0.128) (0.158)  (0.109)  
Illness days ratio 1.61 1.90 0.2028 1.40 0.3368 
 (3.41) (4.25)  (2.92)  
Consumption quintiles       
Poorest quintile 0.220 0.177 0.0662 0.216 0.8870 
 (0.415) (0.382)  (0.412)  
2nd quintile 0.202 0.194 0.7424 0.209 0.7910 
 (0.402) (0.396)  (0.407)  
3rd quintile 0.204 0.225 0.3684 0.150 0.0367 
 (0.403) (0.418)  (0.357)  
4th quintile 0.183 0.212 0.2220 0.199 0.5475 
 (0.387) (0.409)  (0.340)  
Richest quintile 0.191 0.191 0.9965 0.227 0.2032 
 (0.394) (0.393)  (0.418)  
Trust in modern heath care       
Disagree 0.055 0.058 0.8683 0.165 0.0000 
 (0.229) (0.233)  (0.371)  
Neither agree nor disagree 0.043 0.058 0.2621 0.093 0.0024 
 (0.203) (0.233)  (0.291)  
Agree 0.902 0.885 0.3564 0.742 0.0000 
 (0.298) (0.319)  (0.902)  
Access to public infrastructure      
Travel time to the nearest health center (in minutes) 70.00 64.07 0.0235 59.30 0.0002 
 (43.37) (43.37)  (37.69)  
Travel time to the nearest public hospital (in minutes) 113.58 114.44 0.8373 100.33 0.0012 
 (65.83) (75.51)  (53.88)  
Travel time to the nearest asphalt road (in minutes) 80.31 78.58 0.6193 58.51 0.0000 
 (53.09) (63.20)  (48.04)  
Travel time to the nearest all weather road (in minutes) 34.79 32.91 0.3718 27.91 0.0000 
 (33.69) (35.35)  (31.22)  
Access to improved water 0.783 0.731 0.0369 0.865 0.0014 
 (0.412) (0.444)  (0.342)  
Access to modern light 0.047 0.042 0.6892   0.162 0.0000 
 (0.212) (0.202)  (0.369)  
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VARIABLES Insured hhds 
in CBHI 
districts 
(N=489) 
1 
Non-Insured 
hhds in CBHI 
districts 
(N=714) 
2 
P-value 
H0: (1=2) 
 
3 
Non-Insured 
hhds in non-
CBHI districts 
       (N=429) 
          4 
P-value 
H0: (1=4) 
 
5 
Radio use 0.744 0.697 0.0696 0.828 0.0023 
 (0.437) (0.437)  (0.377)  
Mobile phone use 0.419 0.392 0.3391 0.559 0.0000 
 (0.494) (0.489)  (0.497)  
Characteristics of health facility       
Share of heads who have completed first degree (12+3) 0.45 0.464 0.6293 0.625 0.0000 
 (0.498) (0.499)  (0.485)  
Share of the heads who have completed diploma (10+3) 0.55 0.536 0.6293 0.375 0.0000 
 (0.498) (0.499)  (0.485)  
Share of who have undertaken job training 0.81 0.826 0.4754 0.75 0.0306 
 (0.393) (0.379)  (0.434)  
Share of health facilities with blood testing equipment 0.924 0.772 0.0000 0.917 0.6723 
 (0.265) (0.419)  (0.277)  
Share of health facilities with urine testing equipment 0.939 0.879 0.0005 0.917 0.2032 
 (0.240) (0.326)  (0.277)  
Average waiting time before getting patient card 10.56 14.60 0.0000 11.24 0.2451 
 (10.06) (12.59)  (5.70)  
Average waiting time to see healthcare professional 28.33 38.48 0.0000 28.375 0.9747 
 (23.97) (29.42)  (11.47)  
The share of health facilities which were considered as providing 
high quality care 
0.652 0.399 0.0000 0.708 0.0741 
 (0.478) (0.489)  (0.455)  
Someone to rely on in case of shock 0.403 0.372 0.2846 0. 370 0.3165 
 (0.491) (0.484)  (0.483)  
Religion of the head       
Muslim 0.190 0.171 0.4022 0.522 0.0000 
 (0.393) (0.377)  (0.501)  
Orthodox Christian 0.622 0.595 0.3421 0.25 0.0000 
 (0.485) (0.491)  (0.446)  
Protestant 0.178 0.208 0.1920 0.186 0.7468 
 (0.383) (0.406)  (0.390)  
Other religion or no religion 0.010 0.026 0.0535 0. 042 0.0024 
 (0.101) (0.159)  (0. 200)  
Regions       
Tigray 0.207 0.279 0.0042 0.25 0.1217 
 (0.405) (0.449)  (0.434)  
Amhara 0.303 0.215 0.0005 0.25 0.0800 
 (0. 460) (0. 411)  (0.434)  
Oromiya  0.272 0.235 0.1476 0.25 0.4565 
 (0.445) (0. 424)  (0.434)  
SNNPR 0.219 0.271 0.0399 0.25 0.2717 
 (0.414) (0.447)  (0.434)  
      
Number of observations 489 735  408  
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Table A2 
Probability of joining the pilot scheme (marginal effects after logit,  
only for households in the CBHI districts) 
VARIABLES Marginal 
effects 
(Std. Err.) 
 Marginal 
effects 
     (Std. Err.) 
Household head characteristics  Access to public infrastructure  
Male headed hh. 0.0149 Travel time to the nearest health center (in minutes) 0.000820* 
 (0.0509)  (0.000432) 
Age of hh. head 0.000376 Travel time to the nearest public hospital (in minutes) 0.000240 
 (0.00178)  (0.000429) 
Head has informal education 0.0271 Travel time to the nearest all weather road (in minutes) -0.000101 
 (0.0510)  (0.000601) 
Head has primary or above education 0.0713 Travel time to the nearest asphalt road (in minutes) -0.000181 
 (0.0438)  (0.000538) 
  Access to improved water 0.0377 
Household size 0.0258**  (0.0361) 
 (0.0105) Access to modern light -0.0687 
HH composition (ref: Share of male aged 16 to 64)   (0.0680) 
Share of children aged under 6 -0.149  Radio use -0.0357 
 (0.171)  (0.0375) 
Share of male aged 6 to 15 0.00178 Mobile phone use 0.0323 
 (0.159)  (0.0361) 
Share of female aged 6 to 15 0.0941 Characteristics of health facility  
 (0.173) Share of heads of facilities who have degree (ref: head has diploma) -0.124 
Share of female aged 16 to 64 0.00755  (0.0783) 
 (0.199) Head of the facility has undertaken on-the-job training -0.0728 
Share of elderly aged above 64 -0.247  (0.104) 
 (0.185) Has blood testing equipment 0.332*** 
Health status of hh. members (ref: share of hh. members 
with good SAH) 
  (0.0583) 
Share of household with fair SAH -0.0802 Has urine testing equipment -0.0612 
 (0.0562)  (0.117) 
Share of household with low SAH 0.0501 Average waiting time before getting patient card -0.00219 
 (0.117)  (0.00461) 
Illness days ratio 0.00437 Average waiting time to see health professional -0.00487** 
 (0.00517)  (0.00214) 
SES (Consumption quintiles, ref : Poorest quintile)  Health facilities which were considered as providing high quality care 
(ref: low quality care) 
0.167** 
2nd quintile 0.0365  (0.0687) 
 (0.0519) Religion of the head  (ref: Muslim)  
3rd quintile 0.0311 Orthodox Christian 0.156** 
 (0.0460)  (0.0792) 
4th quintile 0.0323 Protestant 0.147 
 (0.0516)  (0.109) 
Richest quintile 0.0547 Other religion or no religion -0.0660 
 (0.0633)  (0.142) 
Trust in modern heath care (ref: disagree)  Regions  (ref: SNNPR)  
Neither agree nor disagree -0.0522 Tigray 0.232* 
 (0.0763)  (0.126) 
Agree 0.0755 Amhara 0.244** 
 (0.0667)  (0.113) 
  Oromiya  0.239** 
   (0.118) 
    
Number of observations                                   1,189 
Pseudo R-squared           0.1479  
Log pseudo likelihood          -682.667  
Note: Outcome variable is CBHI enrollment status of the household in 2012. All control variables are for the baseline year; Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the village level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A3 
 Inpatient care utilization by CBHI membership status (balanced panel) 
Outcome variable   CBHI pilot districts  Non-CBHI pilot 
districts 
(N= 384) 
 Insured 
households  
(N= 569) 
 Uninsured 
households  
(N= 616) 
 
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
The share of households using inpatient care 
from modern providers  
0.029 0.031 0.046 0.036 0.037 0.024 0.008 0.034 0.029 
The share of households using inpatient care 
from public providers 
0.025 0.023 0.026 0.029 0.032 0.015 0.005 0.005 0.016 
The share of households used inpatient care 
from private providers 
0.006 0.023 0.039 0.006 0.029 0.019 0.003 0.031 0.029 
 Notes: In 2011, a household is categorized under insured group if the household was insured in 2012 or in 2013. Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the 
two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. The figures refer to the use of inpatient care in the 12 
months preceding the survey. 
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Table A4 
The impact of CBHI on the probability of inpatient care utilization 
Outcome variable Fixed effects without covariates Fixed effects with time varying 
covariates 
Fixed effects after matching a 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(1) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(2) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(3) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(4) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(5) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-
pilot districts 
(6) 
Control 
hh. from 
pilot 
districts 
(7) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(8) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(9) 
Share of households using inpatient 
care from modern providers  
0.00279 -0.0160 -0.00304 0.00227 -0.0159 -0.00317 0.00526 -0.0242 -0.00225 
(0.0126) (0.0120) (0.0113) (0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0122) (0.0133) (0.0150) (0.0119) 
Share of households using inpatient 
care from public providers  
0.00728 -0.00992 0.000918 0.00814 -0.00855 0.00239 0.00988 -0.0158 0.00216 
(0.0106) (0.00977) (0.00945) (0.0113) (0.0105) (0.0101) (0.0116) (0.0116) (0.0104) 
Share of households using inpatient 
care from private providers  
0.00241 -0.00506 0.000702 0.00106 -0.00492 -0.000511 0.00282 -0.0123 0.000114 
(0.0102) (0.0106) (0.00938) (0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0100) (0.0107) (0.0135) (0.00979) 
Number of observations 3,555 3,126 4,707 3,369 2,940 4,418 3,265 1,906 4,146 
Notes: Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Outcome variable is equal to one if at least one household member has used inpatient care in the twelve months preceding the survey; a Nearest neighbor matching was 
used to create a sample of treated and matched controls.  
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Table A5 
The impact of CBHI on out-of-pocket spending for inpatient care 
Outcome variable Fixed effects without covariates Fixed effects with time varying 
covariates 
Fixed effects after matching a 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(1) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(2) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(3) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(4) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(5) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(6) 
Control 
hh. from 
pilot 
districts 
(7) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(8) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(9) 
Consultation and medicine spending 
 
-4.448 -20.51 -11.32 -6.571 -21.50 -12.29 3.833 1.083 -5.933 
(23.84) (22.35) (21.57) (26.13) (25.05) (23.83) (25.29) (29.50) (22.87) 
Transport and other health care  
 
-0.0126 -7.807 -2.763 -2.200 -6.697 -2.951 -1.550 -7.118 -3.277 
(7.405) (7.807) (6.763) (8.322) (8.777) (7.547) (8.584) (10.09) (7.783) 
Total health spending  
 
-4.461 -28.31 -14.08 -8.771 -28.20 -15.24 2.283 -6.035 -9.210 
(29.85) (27.92) (26.81) (32.87) (31.29) (29.59) (32.38) (36.62) (28.93) 
Number of observations 3,555 3,126 4,707 3,369 2,940 4,418 3,265 1,906 4,146 
Notes: Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; Outcome 
variable is household’s health care payment (in Birr) for inpatient care in the twelve months preceding the survey; a Nearest neighbor matching was used to create a sample of treated and matched controls.  
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Table A6 
The impact of CBHI on incidence of health spending if health spending is at least 5% of household monthly expenditure 
Outcome variable Fixed effects without covariates Fixed effects with time varying 
covariates 
Fixed effects after matching a 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(1) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(2) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(3) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(4) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(5) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(6) 
Control 
hh. from 
pilot 
districts 
(7) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(8) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(9) 
Consultation/medicine spending is at 
least 5% of household monthly 
expenditure  
-0.0221 -0.0616*** -0.0411** -0.0130 -0.0562** -0.0351* -0.00936 -0.0446 -0.0282 
(0.0212) (0.0201) (0.0191) (0.0226) (0.0222) (0.0205) (0.0217) (0.0296) (0.0201) 
Transport/other health care related 
spending is at least 5% of household 
monthly expenditure  
-0.00576 -0.00667 -0.00842 -0.00699 -0.00785 -0.00979 -0.00436 0.00567 -0.00646 
(0.0123) (0.0109) (0.0107) (0.0133) (0.0117) (0.0113) (0.0131) (0.0158) (0.0112) 
Total health care spending is at least 
5% of household monthly expenditure 
-0.0232 -0.0579*** -0.0417** -0.0164 -0.0540** -0.0370* -0.0124 -0.0318 -0.0301 
(0.0224) (0.0207) (0.0196) (0.0241) (0.0229) (0.0213) (0.0235) (0.0297) (0.0212) 
Number of observations 3,555 3,126 4,707 3,369 2,940 4,418 3,265 1,906 4,146 
Notes: Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1; Healthcare spending is for both inpatient and outpatient care services; a Nearest neighbor matching was used to create a sample of treated and matched controls.  
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Table A7 
The impact of CBHI on incidence of health spending if health spending is at least 10% of household monthly expenditure 
Outcome variable Fixed effects without covariates Fixed effects with time varying 
covariates 
Fixed effects after matching a 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(1) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(2) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(3) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(4) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(5) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(6) 
Control 
hh. from 
pilot 
districts 
(7) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(8) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
and non-pilot 
districts 
(9) 
Consultation/medicine spending is at 
least 10% of household monthly 
expenditure  
0.00172 -0.0148 -0.00674 0.00442 -0.0129 -0.00545 0.0112 -0.0151 -0.000341 
(0.0157) (0.0163) (0.0148) (0.0165) (0.0172) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0224) (0.0145) 
Transport/other health care related 
spending is at least 10% of household 
monthly expenditure  
-0.00417 -0.00386 -0.00622 -0.00411 -0.00475 -0.00677 -0.00318 -0.00199 -0.00532 
(0.00698) (0.00718) (0.00662) (0.00741) (0.00763) (0.00694) (0.00727) (0.0106) (0.00674) 
Total health care spending is at least 
10% of household monthly expenditure 
-0.00462 -0.0232 -0.0145 -0.00328 -0.0214 -0.0143 0.00350 -0.0131 -0.00865 
(0.0167) (0.0165) (0.0152) (0.0176) (0.0177) (0.0160) (0.0166) (0.0234) (0.0153) 
Number of observations 3,555 3,126 4,707 3,369 2,940 4,418 3,265 1,906 4,146 
Notes: Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level; Healthcare spending is 
for both inpatient and outpatient care services; a Nearest neighbor matching was used to create a sample of treated and matched controls.  
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Table A8 
Cost of healthcare care, balanced panel, conditional on health care use in all survey years Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Outcome variable 
 
Outpatient care 
CBHI pilot districts Non-CBHI pilot districts 
Insured households  Uninsured households 
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 
Modern care price 54.2 61.7 21.9 36.0 47.6 74.0 67.5 96.4 93.3 
 (60.7) (116.4) (61.0) (39.6) (66.5) (123.4) (107.8) (114.5) (102.4) 
Number of observations 57 45 49 37 49 45 23 23 23 
Public care price 46.6 40.0 9.0 32.0 40.1 39.2 31.4 79.3 78.9 
 (51.6) (63.1) (22.6) (37.9) (64.8) (41.4) (23.9) (74.2) (44.0) 
Number of observations 28 22 27 18 24 19 8 8 8 
Note: There are no households that reported utilization of private care in all surveys. In 2011, a household is categorized under insured group if the 
household was insured in 2012 or in 2013. Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up surveys) are used to produce 
the results. Cost of outpatient care is defined as a household’s payment for health - consultation and medicine, in Birr, per outpatient visit in the two 
months preceding the survey. 
 
 
Table A9 
Cost of healthcare use, balanced panel, conditional on healthcare use in all survey years 
Outcome variable Fixed effects without covariates Fixed effects with time varying covariates 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(1) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(2) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(3) 
Control hh. 
from pilot 
districts 
 
(4) 
Control hh. 
from non-
pilot 
districts 
(5) 
Control hh. 
from pilot and 
non-pilot 
districts 
(6) 
Modern care price  
 
 
Number of observations 
-42.25*** -44.03** -42.79*** -40.57** -31.43 -37.93** 
(14.10) (20.00) (14.34) (16.62) (22.74) (16.48) 
      
282 240 351 271 234 339 
Public care price  
 
 
Number of observations 
-22.64* -34.41* -33.21** -21.65 -30.45* -30.04** 
(13.14) (18.67) (13.79) (14.52) (16.35) (13.85) 
      
138 108 162 132 104 155 
Notes:  There are no households that reported utilization of private care in all surveys and there are no estimates for price of private care outcome. 
Only households surveyed three times (in the baseline and the two follow up surveys) are used to produce the results. Standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at the village level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Outcome variable is defined as a household’s payment for outpatient care per visit - 
consultation and medicine, in Birr, in the two months preceding the survey.  
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Table A10 
Placebo test comparing change in outpatient care use between the two control groups  
(Difference-in-difference, only for households in the balanced panel) 
Outcome Variable    Mean difference b/n years Outcome Variable   Mean difference b/n years 
2011 & 2012 2012 & 2013 2011 & 2012 2012 & 2013 
Share of households using outpatient care 
from modern providers  
-0.0475 
(0.0520) 
-0.0527 
(0.0425) 
The share of households used outpatient 
care from public hospital  
-0.00874 
(0.0169) 
-0.0296** 
(0.0146) 
Share of households using outpatient care 
from public providers 
-0.0364 
(0.0439) 
-0.00681 
(0.0392) 
No. of outpatient visits per hh. member to 
modern facility  
-0.0219 
(0.0315) 
-0.0175 
(0.0291) 
Share of households using outpatient care 
from private providers (clinic) 
-0.0423 
(0.0394) 
0.0235 
(0.0312) 
No. of outpatient visits per hh. member to 
public facility  
-0.00764 
(0.0235) 
-0.0136 
(0.0217) 
Share of households using outpatient care 
from a health post (public) 
0.00735 
(0.0147) 
-0.0125 
(0.0135) 
No. of outpatient visits per hh. member to 
private facility  
-0.0285 
(0.0217) 
0.00852 
(0.0214) 
Share of households using outpatient care 
from health centers (public) 
-0.00135 
(0.0369) 
-0.00806 
(0.0309) 
   
Note: Probability of using outpatient care is equal to one if at least one household member has used outpatient care in the two months preceding the survey. Intensity of 
outpatient care use is number of outpatient visits per household member in the two months preceding the survey; Robust standard errors in parentheses; **p<0.05.  
 
 
Table A11 
Placebo test comparing change in healthcare spending between the two control groups  
(Difference-in-difference, only for households in the balanced panel) 
Outcome Variable    Mean difference b/n years Outcome Variable   Mean difference b/n years 
2011 & 2012 2012 & 2013 2011 & 2012 2012 & 2013 
Consultation and medicine spending for 
outpatient care  
-11.66 
(17.54) 
-30.07 
(22.39) 
The share of households used outpatient care 
from public hospital for inpatient care 
-14.08 
(22.59) 
-25.78 
(28.07) 
Transport and other health care related 
spending for outpatient care 
-3.057 
(3.984) 
1.819 
(5.345) 
No. of outpatient visits per hh. member to 
modern facility for inpatient care 
-10.35 
(6.898) 
-5.959 
(17.24) 
Total health spending for outpatient care -14.71 
(20.28) 
-28.25 
(25.84) 
No. of outpatient visits per hh. member to 
public facility for inpatient care 
-24.42 
(28.14) 
-31.74 
(38.08) 
Note: Outpatient health care spending is household’s health care payment (in Birr) in the two months preceding the survey; Inpatient health care spending is household’s 
health care payment (in Birr) in the twelve months preceding the survey; Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level.  
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Table A12 
Placebo test comparing change in healthcare spending as share of consumption expenditure between two control groups  
(Difference-in-difference, only for households in the balanced panel) 
Outcome Variable    Mean difference b/n years Outcome Variable   Mean difference b/n years 
2011 & 2012 2012 & 2013 2011 & 2012 2012 & 2013 
Consultation/medicine spending as 
share of household monthly 
expenditure  
-0.00709 
(0.00556) 
-0.00577 
(0.00470) 
Incidence of total health care spending is at least 
5% of  household monthly expenditure 
-0.0716* 
(0.0362) 
0.00496 
(0.0305) 
Transport/other health care related 
spending as share of household monthly 
expenditure  
-0.00169 
(0.00159) 
0.00151 
(0.00185) 
Incidence of households where 
consultation/medicine spending is at least 10% of 
household monthly expenditure 
-0.0269 
(0.0261) 
-0.00849 
(0.0181) 
Total health care spending as share of 
household monthly expenditure 
-0.00878 
(0.00660) 
-0.00426 
(0.00587) 
Incidence of households where transport/other 
health care related spending is at least 10% of 
household monthly expenditure 
0.00424 
(0.00723) 
-0.00945 
(0.00850) 
Incidence of households where 
consultation/medicine spending is at 
least 5% of household monthly 
expenditure 
-0.0686* 
(0.0364) 
-0.0121 
(0.0293) 
Incidence of total health care spending is at least 
10% of  household monthly expenditure 
-0.0276 
(0.0281) 
-0.0147 
(0.0206) 
Incidence of households where 
transport/other health care related 
spending is at least 5% of household 
monthly expenditure 
-0.0156 
(0.0153) 
0.0187 
(0.0160) 
   
Note: Household healthcare expenditure is for both inpatient and outpatient care services and is expressed as a share of monthly household consumption expenditure; Catastrophic 
healthcare expenditure is equal to one if the monthly healthcare expenditure of the household is more than or equal to 5 (or 10)% of monthly household consumption expenditure; 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.1. 
 
 
